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hongyun20140917 姓 名: 洪昀
系 别: 会计系
职 称: 助理教授
办 公 室: 工商管理学院办公楼328
办公电话:  
移动电话: 15111166760 
E-mail: hongyun1494@163.com

个人简介

洪昀,博士,湖南大学工商管理学院助理教授,硕士研究生导师。湖南大学工商管理学院管理学硕士,上海财经大学会计学院管理学博士,湖南大学工商管理学院管理科学与工程博士后(在站)。参与多项国家自然科学基金课题。

教育背景

2014.09-

 

湖南大学

 

管理科学与工程

 

博士后

2009.09-2013.06

  

上海财经大学

  

会计学

 

博士

2007.09-2009.07

  

湖南大学

  

会计学

 

硕士

2003.09-2007.07

  

湖南大学

  

会计学

 

学士

职业经历

2013.06~2014.05

工商银行上海分行 项目经理

2014.05~至今

湖南大学工商管理学院助理教授

讲授课程

本科:高级财务会计学,国际会计

MBA & 硕士:会计理论

研究领域

1.会计与审计研究

2.经济制度与公司治理

3.金融工程

研究成果

论文

[1] Xue Shuang,Hong Yun,Earnings management, corporate governance and expense stickiness.China Journal of Accounting Research, China Journal of Accounting Research, 2015,41(1):41-58

摘要:Cost and expense stickiness is an important issue in accounting and economics research, and the literature has shown that cost stickiness cannot be separated from managers’ motivations. In this paper, we examine the effects that earnings management has on expense stickiness. Defining small positive profits or small earnings increases as earnings management, we observe significant expense stickiness in the non-earnings-management sub-sample, compared with the earnings-management sub-sample. When we divide expenses into R&D, advertising and other general expenses, we find that managers control expenses mainly by decreasing general expenses. We further examine corporate governance’s effect on expense stickiness. Using factor analysis, we extract eight main factors and find that good corporate governance reduces expense stickiness. Finally, we investigate the interaction effects of earnings management and corporate governance on expense stickiness. The empirical results show that good corporate governance can further reduce cost stickiness, although its effect is not as strong as that of earnings management。

[2] Pu Danlin ,Hong, Yun ; Hsueh, Ming-Hsien. Chief Financial Officers’ Power, Institutional Environment, and Corporate Effective Tax Rate: Evidence from China .Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, 2015, 51(1):196-213

摘要:In this study, we investigate how chief financial officers’ (CFOs’) power and institutional environment influence corporate effective tax rates (ETRs). Using a sample of Chinese listed firms from 2004 to 2010, we find that firms with expert power or political power CFOs enjoy a low effective tax rate. Furthermore, CFOs’ expert power plays a more important function in reducing ETR in regions with a better institutional environment compared to those with less-developed institutions. CFOs’ political power is the most important factor in reducing ETR in regions with a less developed institutional environment than in those regions with a better institutional environment。

[3]JunHuang,ShuangXue,andYunHong,VerticalIntegrationandInventoryManagementEfficiency.ChinaAccountingandFinanceReview, 2016,16(4): 1-48.

摘要:This paper investigates the role of vertical integration in the inventory management of a supply chain. Taking Chinese listed companies from 2001 to 2010 as our sample, we find that vertically integrated firms have lower inventory holdings and volatility, indicating that vertical integration improves firms' inventory management efficiency. Further analyses show that this effect is more pronounced for firms located in regions with a lower level of marketisation and for firms facing higher demand volatility and business growth. In addition, the more thoroughly firms have accomplished vertical integration, the more greatly vertical integration increases inventory management efficiency. Finally, we find that the positive impact of vertical integration on inventory management is more significant in industries with no overcapacity, for diversified firms, and during non-crisis periods.

[4] Shuang Xue; Ye, Feiteng ; Yun Hong. Partner–client relationship and auditor switches. 2013, 1(2):114-137 

摘要:This study investigates the effect of a partner–client relationship on auditor switches. We find that a non-signing partner, especially one who is ‘job-hopping,’ has a significant effect on auditor switches. Specifically, if a partner who was the signatory of a public company’s annual report no longer signs for the accounting firm or leaves the firm, the public company that he or she signed for tends to change its auditor as well. When the job-hopping partner jumps to a new accounting firm with a certificate to service public companies, the probability of an auditor switch is the highest. The former auditee (or ‘client’ hereafter) can follow the partner to the new accounting firm to retain the special partner–client relationship. Furthermore, we consider that there are usually two signing partners with different tenures for a client’s annual report. Empirical results show that the non-signing partner can more significantly affect a client’s auditor switch when he or she is the one with the comparatively longer tenure. These results imply that the partner–client relationship is valuable to accounting firms and will help with client retention. 

[5] 薛爽; 洪昀; 陈昕. 股权性质、政治关系与地方政府拉闸限电——来自有色金属行业的经验证据.金融研究。2013年第3期

摘要:2010年是我国实现"十一五"所规划的万元GDP能耗下降20%目标的收官之年,各地方由于完不成节能减排任务,纷纷对企业进行"拉闸限电"。我们以河北、山西、河南、内蒙古四省的有色金属行业为样本,研究了所有权性质、民营企业政治关系对地方政府拉闸限电行为的影响,并对比分析了不同企业被限电的经济后果。结果表明,地方政府官员在一票否决的强激励考核评价机制下,对高耗能的有色金属行业实行了普遍的限电措施。国有企业被拉闸限电时间要显著少于民营企业,说明存在事实上的所有制歧视。具有政治关系的民营企业比不具有政治关系的民营企业被拉闸限电的概率更低,时间更短。民营企业相对于国有企业、无政治关系的民营企业相对于有政治关系的民营企业在拉闸限电后,销售收入和总(净)资产利润率下降幅度更大。 

[6]薛爽; 叶飞腾;洪昀. 会计师-客户关系与事务所变更.会计研究。2013年第9期

摘要:本文研究会计师-客户关系如何影响客户对事务所的选择。研究发现,如果负责某家上市公司年报审计业务的签字会计师不再为原事务所签字或离开原事务所,那么由该会计师负责签字的上市公司更换事务所的可能性显著提高。尤其是当签字会计师跳槽到另一家具有证劵审计资格的事务所时,客户变更事务所的可能性更高。进一步地,当两位签字会计师任期不同时,如任期较长的签字会计师不再为该客户签字,客户换所的可能性更高。这些结果表明,紧密的会计师-客户关系能够帮助事务所留住客户,对事务所而言具有重要价值。

[7] 薛爽; 都卫锋; 洪昀. CFO影响力与企业税负水平——基于企业所有权视角的分析.财经研究.2012年第10期

摘要:文章基于企业所有权性质的视角,研究了CFO的影响力与公司税负水平之间的关系。文章将CFO影响力分为组织影响力、专业影响力、声誉影响力和所有权影响力。实证结果表明,较强的CFO影响力与企业实际税负水平负相关。进一步研究发现,在不同性质的企业中,CFO影响力与税负水平之间的负相关关系不同。在民营企业中,CFO在四个维度上的影响力均与税负水平显著负相关;在国有企业中,只有CFO所有权影响力与企业税负水平负相关。CFO影响力对企业实际税负水平的影响主要存在于民营企业,说明CFO职能定位在国有企业和民营企业中存在差异。

 

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